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The Justifiable Need Requirement is Not Justifiable     
By: Victoria Tengelics 
 
I. Introduction 
The Second Amendment right to “keep and bear arms” has been the subject of heated debate 
in this country.  Through two crucial cases heard between 2008 and 2010, District of Columbia v 
Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) and McDonald v City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010),  the 
Supreme Court changed the landscape of Second Amendment law but left many questions 
unanswered.  Although the Supreme Court asserted that citizens have the right to protect 
themselves in their home with the use of a handgun, the Court did not opine as to the extent of 
the protection outside the home or the proper standard of review.1 
Whether the Second Amendment provides the right to carry a gun for personal safety in 
public, and under what circumstances the right applies, has become an issue of importance for 
gun owners in states where the permitting scheme is discretionary.  Under the licensing 
requirements in New Jersey, Maryland, New York, California, and Hawaii, applicants must show 
that a specific threat or need for protection exists before a permit to carry a firearm in public will 
be issued (the statutes use terms such as “justifiable need,” “good cause,” “good-and-substantial 
reason”  etc.).2  While the definition of these terms differs depending on the state that is applying 
                                                 
1District of Columbia v. Heller,554 U.S. 570 (2008) (holding that the right to bear arms is an individual right);  
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (holding that Second Amendment applies to the states); see also, 
Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 88 – 89 (2nd Cir. 2012), cert. denied sub nom. Kachalsky v. 
Cacace, 133 S. Ct. 1806 (2013). 
2 Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426 (3rd Cir. 2013), cert. denied sub nom. Drake v. Jerejian, 134 S. Ct. 2134  (2014) 
(challenge to New Jersey’s requirement to show  “justifiable need” in order to obtain a permit to carry a firearm in 
public); Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865 (4th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 422 (2013) (challenge to 
Maryland’s requirement to show “good-and-substantial reason in order to obtain a permit to carry a firearm in 
public); Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81 (2nd Cir. 2012), cert. denied sub nom. Kachalsky v. 
Cacace, 133 S. Ct. 1806 (2013) (challenge to New York’s requirement to show “proper cause” in order to obtain a 
permit to carry a fire arm in public); Peruta v County of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2014), vacated,  2015 
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it, “they are essentially the same-the applicant must show a special need for self-defense 
distinguishable from that of the population at large, often through a specific and particularized 
threat of harm.”3 
In those circuits where states have licensing regimens that include these subjective 
requirements, a circuit split had emerged as to whether the discretionary requirement of “good 
cause” violates the constitutional right to “bear arms” under the Second Amendment.4  In 
February 2014, the Ninth Circuit became the fourth Circuit Court of Appeals to weigh in on the 
issue of whether a state may require “justifiable need,” “good cause,” or “proper cause,” etc. 
before issuing a permit to carry a handgun in public.5  In a three - judge panel opinion the Ninth 
Circuit held in, Peruta v. County of San Diego,6 that California’s “good cause” requirement, as 
applied in San Diego County was unconstitutional.7  On March 26, 2015, the Ninth Circuit 
vacated the February 2014 opinion in Peruta v. County of San Diego and voted to re-hear the 
matter en banc.8 The new hearing will be held in San Francisco in the third week of June, 2015.9  
                                                                                                                                                             
U.S. App. LEXIS 4941 (9th Cir. March 26, 2015) (challenge to San Diego County, California’s application of 
California’s “good cause” requirement in order to obtain a permit to carry a firearm in public); HAW. REV. STAT. 
§134-9 (2015) (Hawaii’s statute requiring “an applicant [to] show[s] reason to fear injury to the applicant’s person 
or property”);  
3 Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 442 (3rd Cir. 2013) (Hardiman, J., dissenting), cert. denied  sub nom. Drake v. 
Jerejian, 134 S. Ct. 2134  (2014). 
4 Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426 (3rd Cir. 2013), cert. denied  sub nom. Drake v. Jerejian, 134 S. Ct. 2134  (2014) 
(challenge to New Jersey’s requirement to show  “justifiable need” in order to obtain a permit to carry a firearm in 
public- court upheld the requirement); Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865 (4th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 
422 (2013) (challenge to Maryland’s requirement to show “good-and-substantial reason in order to obtain a permit 
to carry a firearm in public – court upheld the requirement); Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81 (2nd 
Cir. 2012), cert. denied sub nom. Kachalsky v. Cacace, 133 S. Ct. 1806 (2013) (challenge to New York’s 
requirement to show “proper cause” in order to obtain a permit to carry a firearm in public – court upheld the 
requirement); Peruta v County of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2014), vacated,  2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 4941 
(9th Cir. March 26, 2015)  (challenge to San Diego County, California’s application of California’s  requirement to 
show “good cause” in order to obtain a permit to carry a firearm in public – court struck down the requirement);   
5 Peruta v County of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2014), vacated,  2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 4941 (9th Cir. 
March 26, 2015). 
6 Id.  
7 Id. at 1175.  
8 Peruta v County of San Diego, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 4941 (9th Cir. March 26, 2015). 
9 Bob Egelko, Concealed Carry Law Gets New Court Date; Panel to Review Ruling by Appeals Court in ’14, S.F. 
CHRON., Mar. 27, 2015, at D1. 
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In addition to the differing opinions concerning the constitutionality of the “good cause” 
discretionary requirement, the circuit courts have also applied different levels of scrutiny.10   
This Note will focus specifically on the constitutionality of the requirement to show 
“justifiable need” before being granted a right to carry permit and the level of scrutiny that 
should apply to the question.  This Note concludes that the proper standard of review is a 
heightened form of intermediate scrutiny in which the court considers all evidence on the effect 
of the legislation.  Under this standard, both the rights of the individual and the interests of the 
government are addressed.  Applying heightened intermediate scrutiny to the justifiable need 
requirement, this Note then determines that the requirement is unconstitutional, as it is not a 
reasonable fit to the substantial interest of the government.   
Part II provides background information including a description of different state licensing 
schemes and a brief history of the right to carry.  Part III presents an overview of the circuits that 
have addressed the specific issue of whether it is permissible for a state to require an individual 
to show justifiable need before being issued a permit to carry a handgun in public.  This will be 
followed, in Part IV, by a discussion of the constitutional standards of review and how they have 
been applied to the Second Amendment.  Part V analyzes the justifiable need requirement under 
intermediate scrutiny, concluding that the Supreme Court should find the requirement 
impermissible as unreasonably burdensome on individual’s Second Amendment rights. 
II. Background 
This Part discusses the varying state requirements for handgun permits as well as the 
historical background underlying the current decisions on the right to carry a firearm for 
protection.   The permitting scheme in most states includes a specific set of standards that, if met, 
                                                 
10 Tyler v. Hillsdale Cnty.  Sheriff’s Dep’t, 775 F.3d 308, 324, (6th Cir. 2014). vacated, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 6638 
(6th Cir. April 21, 2015). 
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requires an individual be allowed a permit to carry.11  In a minority of states, law enforcement 
(or other licensing authority) has discretion, based on the “need” of the applicant, to approve or 
deny a permit application.12  While historical analysis of case law from the time of the country’s 
founding indicates there is a preference towards open carry of firearms, until recently, 
discretionary permitting schemes were not directly reviewed.13 
A. State Permitting Schemes 
Forty-four states currently allow individuals to openly carry a handgun; fourteen of those 
states require a permit.14  However, most states require a permit to carry a concealed firearm.15  
Permit requirements can be divided into two classes:  shall issue and may issue.  Under a “shall 
issue,” regime, unless there is a specific excluding factor such as felony convictions, the permit 
to carry must be issued.16 “In the forty shall-issue States, permitting officials must grant an 
application for handgun carry permits so long as the applicant satisfies certain objective criteria, 
such as a background check and completion of a safety course. In these jurisdictions, a general 
desire for self-defense is sufficient to obtain a handgun.”17  The “may issue” licensing scheme is 
a discretionary class, allowing government officials discretion to decide, sometimes with little 
judicial review, who may carry a gun.18   Only nine states follow a “may-issue” regime.19   
                                                 
11 Drake, 724 F.3d at 441-442 (Hardiman, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
12 Nicholas Moeller, Note, The Second Amendment Beyond The Doorstep: Concealed Carry Post-Heller, 2014 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 1401, 1405 (2014). 
13 Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 91 (2nd Cir. 2012), cert. denied sub nom. Kachalsky v. Cacace, 
133 S. Ct. 1806 (2013);  see also, Jonathan Meltzer, Note, Open Carry for All: Heller and Our Nineteenth-Century 
Second Amendment, 123 YALE L.J. 1486  (2014) (arguing that open carry is the only form of firearm carry that is 
constitutionally protected). 
14Open Carry Map, OpenCarry.org,  http://www.opencarry.org/?page_id=103  (last visited April 26, 2015). . 
15 Jonathan Meltzer, Note, Open Carry for All: Heller and Our Nineteenth-Century Second Amendment, 123 YALE 
L.J. 1486, 1498 (2014). 
16 Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second Amendment, 105 MICH. L. REV. 683, 722 (2007). 
17 Drake, 724 F.3d at  441- 442 (Hardiman, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).). 
18 Moeller, supra note 12, at 1405. 
19 Meltzer, supra note 15, at 1498. 
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Another distinction made in the right to carry context are the differences between open 
carry and concealed carry.  The advantages of open carry are that people are put on notice that 
there is an armed person in their midst.  However, people are more likely to be afraid or 
disconcerted by the visible presence of a weapon; this causes many people to prefer to carry 
concealed weapons.20  While carrying a concealed weapon dissipates the fear some feel by 
seeing an openly carried firearm, critics argue that if the weapon can’t be seen, people are not 
aware of the possible danger and there is more temptation for the carrier to act nefariously.21  On 
the other hand, the Seventh Circuit argued that “knowing that many law-abiding citizens are 
walking the streets armed may make criminals timid.”22  There are not conclusive answers to the 
question of whether allowing citizens to carry weapons, either open or concealed, increases or 
decreases crime rates.23  However, based on the data available, there appears to be little 
correlation between gun ownership and murder rates24 nor does data establish that allowing the 
right to carry in public will increase crime rates in any impactful manner.25 
B.  Historical Analysis 
Both those supporting the right to carry firearms and those contending that governments are 
entitled to regulate under the Second Amendment have used history as far back as medieval 
times to defend their position. As with many topics that provoke intense feelings, history can 
often be wielded to support multiple arguments.  The following section provides an overview of 
the case law and other historical references that have been used by the courts that have addressed 
the “justifiable need” issue.    
                                                 
20 Eugene Volokh, Symposium: The Second Amendment and the Right to Bear Arms After D.C. v. Heller: 
Implementing The Right To Keep and Bear Arms For Self-Defense: An Analytical Framework And A Research 
Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1443, 1521 (2009).  
21 Id. at 1523. 
22 Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 937 (7th Cir. 2012). 
23 Volokh, supra note 20, at 1465-66;  see also, Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 937 (7th Cir. 2012). 
24 Volokh, supra note 20, at 1466. 
25 Moore, 702 F.3d at 937.  
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The Supreme Court in Heller conducted a historical review of post-ratification cases 
because an inquiry into “the public understanding of a legal text in the period after its enactment 
or ratification is a critical tool of constitutional interpretation”26  The Ninth Circuit also relied 
heavily on history to support its contention that the Second Amendment was meant to protect an 
individual’s right to carry a weapon for personal defense.27  The Ninth Circuit determined that 
proper analysis included  a review focusing significantly on state courts at the time of the 
enactment who viewed the right to bear arms, as the Supreme Court does, as an individual right 
to self-defense rather than a militia-based right.28  This proposed review differs from the position 
taken by other circuit courts that addressed the justifiable need issue; in those cases only a very 
brief mention of the history was made or it was not addressed at all.29 
The following is a brief history of the treatment of the right to bear arms by the state courts 
starting after ratification of the Second Amendment and ending in the late nineteenth century.  In 
1822, Kentucky’s highest state court, in Bliss v. Commonwealth,30 interpreted the right to bear 
arms very broadly finding that “[a]n act needn’t amount to a complete destruction of the right to 
be forbidden by the explicit language of the constitution since any statute that diminish[ed] or 
impair[ed the right] as it existed when the constitution was formed would also be void.”31  The 
court therefore struck down the law at issue which banned concealed carry.32  Although in 1840 
                                                 
26 Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1173. (citing District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 605 (2008)). 
27 Id. at 1151, 1167;  .  see also, Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 449 (3rd Cir. 2013) (Hardiman, J., dissenting); see 
also, Volokh, supra note 19, at 1464-65. 
28 Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1174 -75. 
29 Id. at 1174.  see also, Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 431 (3rd Cir. 2013) cert. denied  sub nom. Drake v. Jerejian, 
134 S. Ct. 2134  (2014); Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 91 (2d Cir. 2012) ), cert. denied sub nom. 
Kachalsky v. Cacace, 133 S. Ct. 1806 (2013); Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 875 (4th Cir. Md. 2013) cert. 
denied, 134 S. Ct. 422 (2013). 
30 Bliss v. Commonwealth, 12 Ky. 90 (1822). 
31 Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1156.  (internal quotations omitted) (citing Bliss v. Commonwealth, 12 Ky. 90, 92 (1822)).  
32 Id. (citing Bliss v. Commonwealth, 12 Ky. (2 Litt.) 90, 92. (1822)). 
7 
 
the Supreme Court of Alabama in State v. Reid33   allowed a complete ban on concealed carry of 
firearms, it reminded lawmakers that legislation that “amounts to a destruction of the right, or 
which requires arms to be so borne as to render them wholly useless for the purpose of defence, 
would be clearly unconstitutional.”34  Demonstrating a different perspective, in 1842 in State v. 
Buzzard, 35 the Supreme Court of Arkansas upheld “restrictions on carrying weapons for self-
defense as permissible police-power regulations.”36  Taken together, the separate majority 
opinions regard the right secured by the Second Amendment as, not an individual right, but as a 
right to bear arms for sole purpose of militia service.37 The dissent in this case found the 
majority’s proposition to “deem the right to be valueless and not worth preserving.”38  In 1846, 
the Georgia Supreme Court in Nunn v. State39 struck down a law that prohibited both concealed 
and open carry holding that a restriction on carrying a weapon is valid only as long “as it does 
not deprive the citizen of his natural right of self-defence, or of his constitutional right to keep 
and bear arms.”40  Four years later, in State v. Chandler,41 the Louisiana Supreme Court used a 
similar rationale to uphold a law banning concealed weapons when open carry was not 
restricted.42  In 1871, the Tennessee Supreme Court in Andrews v. State43 found that although the 
right to bear arms was an individual right the main purpose under the Tennessee Constitution 
                                                 
33 State v. Reid, 1 Ala. 612 (1840). 
34 Id. at 1158(quoting State v. Reid, 1 Ala. 612 (1840)); see also, .Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 449 (3rd Cir. 2013) 
(Hardiman, J., dissenting), cert. denied  sub nom. Drake v. Jerejian, 134 S. Ct. 2134  (2014).). 
35 State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18 (1842). 
36 Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1159, (citing State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18 (1842)). 
37 Id. at 1159, (citing State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18, 22, 32 (1842)). 
38 State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18, 35 (Ark. 1842) (Lacy, J., dissenting).    
39 Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243 (1846). 
40 Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1158-59, (quoting Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243, 251 (1846) (emphasis in original).  
41 State v. Chandler, 5 La.Ann. 489 (1850). 
42 Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1159 (citing State v. Chandler, 5 La.Ann. 489 (1850); see also, Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 
449 (3rd Cir. 2013)  (Hardiman, J., dissenting), cert. denied  sub nom. Drake v. Jerejian, 134 S. Ct. 2134  (2014). 
43 Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn. 165  (1871); see also, see also, Peruta v. County of  San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1157 
(9th Cir. 2014), vacated,  2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 4941 (9th Cir. March 26, 2015). 
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was for the purpose of promoting an efficient militia and common defense.44  For that reason, the 
court found that a ban with regard to the carrying of “pocket” pistols is constitutional as it was 
not generally a weapon used in the military at the time.45  However, the court held that the 
legislature can regulate, but not ban, the carrying of firearms which could be “adapted to the 
usual equipment of the soldier” and therefore is needed in peacetime to enable him to be a more 
efficient marksman.46  In 1878, the Arkansas Supreme Court, in Wilson v. State,47 changed its 
position from the Buzzard ruling when they stated that “to prohibit the citizen from wearing or 
carrying a war arm, except upon his own premises or when on a journey traveling through the 
country with baggage, or when acting as or in aid of an officer, is an unwarranted restriction 
upon his constitutional right to keep and bear arms.”48  Not all states agreed with the view that at 
least some form of public carry of weapons was required; “at least four states once banned the 
carrying of pistols and similar weapons in public, both in a concealed or an open manner.”49  As 
this history shows, most states in which the courts viewed the right as being an individual right 
protected at least some form of the right to carry.   
Other scholars and gun rights advocates focus solely on the language of the Second 
Amendment, specifically the term “keep and bear arms.”  “Noah Webster’s 1828 first edition of 
An American Dictionary of the English Language  shows several subtle variations on the verb 
“bear” in the sense of “to carry” or “to wear”; the primary definition is universal “to carry; … as, 
                                                 
44 Id. at  182.  
45 Id. at 186. 
46 Id. at 186.  
47 Wilson v. State, 33 Ark. 557 (Ark. 1878). 
48 Id. at  560;  see also, Peruta v. County of  San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1159 (9th Cir. 2014), vacated,  2015 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 4941 (9th Cir. March 26, 2015). 
49 Kachalsky, v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 90 (2nd Cir. 2012), cert. denied sub nom. Kachalsky v. Cacace, 
133 S. Ct. 1806 (2013). 
.  
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‘they bear [it] upon the shoulder.”50  The Ninth Circuit also found support from historical 
definitions of the term to “bear arms” gleaned from legal commentaries from the time of the 
ratification of the Second Amendment which were also cited by Heller.51   These commentaries 
equated the right to arm oneself for protection with “the natural right of resistance and self-
preservation.”52  
Many scholars point to English common law, notably the Statute of Northampton, as 
providing an answer as to the viewpoints of our founding fathers and the early colonists.53  The 
statute “provided that unless on King's business no man could go nor ride armed by night nor by 
day, in Fairs, markets, nor in the presence of the Justices or other Ministers, nor in no part 
elsewhere."54 This statute and commentary on it has been interpreted by the Seventh Circuit as 
being concerned with “armed gangs, thieves, and assassins rather than with indoors versus 
outdoors as such.”55  However, “the statute and its implications for the Second Amendment are 
fiercely debated in the scholarship.”56 Further, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged St. George 
Tucker’s commentary on the American Constitution, in which Tucker asserted that “[t]he right to 
armed self-defense. . . is the first law of nature, and any law prohibiting any person from bearing 
arms crossed the constitutional line.”57  Although these historical references shed some light on 
how the Second Amendment was viewed at the time it was enacted, they are not instructive on 
                                                 
50 Clayton E. Cramer & Joseph Edward Olson, What did “Bear Arms” Mean in the Second Amendment? 6 GEO. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 511, 520 (2008). 
51 Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1153-54.  
52 Id. at 1154. (citing District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570,  594 (2008)).  
53 Meltzer, supra note 18, at 1507. 
54 Moore, 702 F.3d at  936 (citing 2 Edw. III, c. 3 (1328).) (internal citations omitted). 
55 Id. (citing Edward Coke, Institutes of the Laws of England 162 (1797)). (“Chief Justice Coke interpreted the 
statute to allow a person to possess weapons inside the home but not to "assemble force, though he be extremely 
threatened, to go with him to church, or market, or any other place."). 
56 Meltzer, supra note 15,  at1507. 
57 Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1154. (internal quotations omitted).  (citing St. George Tucker, Blackstone’s Commentaries:  
With Notes of Reference to the Constitution and Laws of the Federal Government of the United States; and of the 
Commonwealth of Virginia 289 (1803)). 
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whether the right to carry a firearm for defense can be limited to specific and known threats of 
danger. 
Even with the same facts, some courts as well as scholars, view the history as supporting 
either complete or partial prohibitions on the right to carry a concealed weapon.  In his March 
2014 article, Open Carry for All: Heller and Our Nineteenth-Century Second Amendment, 
Jonathan Meltzer asserted the view that these early decisions specifically support open carry 
only:  
“The cases, while differing subtly in their discussion of the right to carry, point 
decisively toward a robust right to carry weapons openly for self-defense but no 
right at all to carry such weapons concealed. Indeed, these cases are notable for 
their understanding of the right to keep and bear arms as not encompassing 
concealed carry.”58   
 
While there does appear to be a preference towards open carry over concealed carry in 
these cases, the issue addressed by these courts was not whether there was a right specifically to 
concealed carry or open carry.  Rather the issues were whether there was a right to carry at all 
and if there was such a right, to what extent does the legislature have the ability to restrict that 
right?  What history does not address on point is the question of whether a state can require an 
applicant for a license to carry to “demonstrate[e] a special need for self-protection”59   
III. Circuit Split over Justifiable Need Requirement 
Although other courts have addressed the right to carry weapons in public, only four have 
specifically addressed the question of “justifiable need.” The following is a summary of those 
cases and their holdings.  
 
 
                                                 
58 Meltzer, supra note 15, at 1511. 
59 Kachalsky, 701 F.3d  at 91. 
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A. Second Circuit - Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81 (2nd Cir. 2012) 
The Second Circuit addressed New York’s statute regarding obtaining a permit to carry a 
concealed firearm in Kachalsky v. County of Westchester.   New York’s statue allows for “shall 
issue” permitting for people in occupations such as bank messengers, certain judges and 
individuals who work in prisons or jails.60 The statute also allows for possession in the home or 
“in a place of business by a merchant or storekeeper.”61   However, outside of the occupations 
expressly listed in the statute, all other individuals must show that they have “proper cause.” 62   
New York’s definition of “proper cause” is not included in the statute but the New York State 
courts have held that it includes target practice and hunting as proper causes for requesting a 
license to carry (licenses of this kind are restricted to only those purposes).63    If the interest is 
for self-defense then the person must show that they have a “special need” beyond a general 
concern for protection of themselves or their property that is “distinguishable from that of the 
general community or of persons engaged in the same profession.’64   The decision as to whether 
proper cause has been shown is made by licensing officers who are “vested with considerable 
discretion.”65  “Every application triggers a local investigation by police into the applicant’s 
mental health history, criminal history, moral character, and in the case of a carry license, 
representations of proper cause.”66 Although judicial review is available to those who are denied 
a license, deference is shown to the government and the decision will only be overturned if it is 
found to be arbitrary and capricious.67  
                                                 
60 Kachalsky, v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 86 (2nd Cir. 2012), cert. denied sub nom. Kachalsky v. Cacace, 
133 S. Ct. 1806 (2013). 
61 Id. at 86. 
62 Id. at 85. 
63 Id. at 86. 
64 Id. at 86, 92.  
65 Id. at 87. 
66 Id. at 86. 
67 Id. 
12 
 
New York began regulating firearms prior to the Constitution.68 Early firearms law in New 
York regulated who could use firearms, when and where they could be used, and even how gun 
power can be stored.69  In New York a license must be obtained in order to own a firearm, which 
includes revolvers, pistols and short barrel rifles and shotguns but does not include standard 
rifles or shotguns.70  Licensees must be “over twenty-one years of age, of good moral character, 
without a history of crime or mental illness, and "concerning whom no good cause exists for the 
denial of the license."71  Since 1913, New York has had a statewide licensing program for the 
carry of firearms in public; the carry license requirements have always mandated that applicants 
show “good moral character, and that proper cause exists for the issuance [of the license].”72  
Under New York law open carry of handguns is not allowed.73   
Five applicants, whose applications were rejected on the basis of “[f]ailure to show any facts 
demonstrating a need for self-protection distinguishable from that of the general public,” brought 
this action asserting that the requirement to show proper cause violates their Second Amendment 
rights.74  Of the five applicants, only one actually attempted to comply with the requirement.75  
The court found the need she listed, that her risk of violence was increased by the fact that she is 
a transgender female, was not specific enough and needed to be a direct threat instead of a 
general concern.76  Included among the other four applicants who did not list a specific threat 
was a “federal law enforcement office with the U.S. Coast Guard.”77 
                                                 
68 Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at  84. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 85.  
71 Id. at 86. 
72 Id. at 85. see also, NY PENAL LAW Penal § 400.00(2)(f) (2014). 
73 Id. at 86. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 86. 
77 Id. 
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The court noted the decisions of the Supreme Court in Heller and McDonald  are controlling 
but not decisive because “Heller was never meant to clarify the entire field of Second 
Amendment Jurisprudence.”78  Although the court stressed that individuals enjoy the greatest 
protection of the right to keep and bear arms in their homes, it acknowledged that the right 
extends outside the home.79   While not as extensive as in Heller or as the Ninth Circuit’s 
analysis, the court conducted a historical review and found that “[h]istory and tradition do not 
speak with one voice here.”80  Discussing many of the cases introduced in the previous Part, the 
court determined that, while there were some courts from the nineteenth century which held that 
at least some form of carry in public was appropriate, there were also at least four states at that 
time that banned public carry altogether regardless of the manner.81  Even the states that did 
allow concealed carry of firearms often regulated them and prohibited carrying them at certain 
times, certain occasions or in certain places.82  Further, though Heller did not address the issue of 
public carry directly, the court did note “the majority of the 19th-century courts to consider the 
question held that prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons were lawful under the Second 
Amendment or state analogues.”83  The court pointed out that there were states with concealed 
carry bans that had limited exceptions, very similar to New York’s proper cause requirement, 
which centered on specific occupations or activities that would put the person in harm’s way.84 
“[S]tates have long recognized a countervailing and competing set of concerns with regard to 
handgun ownership and use in public.”85   
                                                 
78 Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 86. 
79 Id. at 89. 
80 Id. at 90. 
81 Id. at 90. 
82 Id. at 94-95. 
83 Id. at  95, (citing District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570,  626 (2008)). 
84 Id. at  96. 
85 Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at  96. 
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The court determined that the most appropriate standard of review in this case was 
intermediate scrutiny “because our tradition so clearly indicates a substantial role for state 
regulations of the carrying of firearms in public.”86  Based on its reading of Heller and the prior 
historical analysis, the court advised that the right to carry in public is not a “core” right as 
addressed in Heller and therefore is not entitled to heightened scrutiny.87  The court found that 
the right that was infringed upon in Heller was one that was based in the home which is “special 
and subject to limited state regulation.”88 Moreover, “outside the home, firearm rights have 
always been more limited, because public safety interests often outweigh individual interests in 
self-defense.”89  Choosing a different level of scrutiny for restrictions on the Second Amendment 
right within the home versus outside the home is consistent with the standard of review question 
in other constitutional contexts where there are varying degrees of rights and burdens.90   
“Heighted scrutiny is triggered only by those restrictions that (like the complete prohibition on 
handguns struck down in Heller) operate as a substantial burden on the ability of law-abiding 
citizens to possess and use a firearm for self-defense (or for other lawful purposes).”91  The court 
concluded that rational basis was not appropriate because even though Heller did not actually set 
down a level of review, it ruled out rational basis review.92  The court found that “this is 
precisely the type of argument that should be addressed by examining the purpose and impact of 
the law in light of the Plaintiff’s Second Amendment right.”93 
                                                 
86 Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at  96. 
87 Id. at  93-94.  
88 Id. at  94. 
89 Id. at  94. 
90 Id. at  93 - 94. 
91 Id. at  93. 
92 Id. at  93. 
93 Id. at  92. 
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The court determined that, under intermediate scrutiny, New York’s proper cause 
requirement was constitutional.94 There was no question that New York has a “compelling 
governmental interest[] in public safety and crime prevention.”95 The question under 
intermediate review was “whether the proper cause requirement is substantially related to these 
interests.”96  To answer this issue the court gave “substantial deference to the predictive 
judgments of the legislature” as to the impact of the proper cause regulation on the interest.97  
Although there are scientific studies on both sides of the issue, the court found that “it is the 
legislature’s job, not ours, to weigh conflicting evidence and make policy judgments.”98  Further, 
the court dismissed the plaintiffs’ argument that the proper cause standard was arbitrary and not 
a perfect fit to the government’s interests.99  According to the court, the right to self-defense is 
not limitless and it is within New York’s authority to regulate the right.100  The court reiterated 
that the fit need only be substantially related and by “restricting handgun possession in public to 
those who have a reason to possess the weapon for a lawful purpose” the statute meets that 
threshold.101   
B. Fourth Circuit – Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865 (4th Cir. 2013). 
In Woollard v. Gallagher, the Fourth Circuit reversed the Maryland District Court’s ruling 
and found that Maryland’s “good-and-substantial-reason” requirement is constitutional.102  
Maryland requires all but certain classes of people to have a “permit issued . . . before the person 
                                                 
94 Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at  101.  
95 Id. at  97. 
96 Id. at  97. 
97 Id. at  97. 
98 Id. at 99. 
99 Id. at 98. 
100 Id. at  99. 
101 Id. at  98.  
102 Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 868 (4th Cir. 2013) cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 422 (2013). 
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carries, wears, or transports a handgun.”103   According to the statute, permits must be issued 
once a finding is made that “the applicant is an adult without a disqualifying criminal record, 
alcohol or drug addiction, or propensity for violence” and the applicant has shown that they have 
“good and substantial reason to wear, carry, or transport a handgun, such as a finding that the 
permit is necessary as a reasonable precaution against apprehended danger.”104 Authority to issue 
permits has been assigned to the Handgun Permit Unit of the Maryland State Police.105  The 
Handgun Permit Unit has categorized  “good and substantial reason” showings as follows:   
(1) for business activities, either at the business owner's request or on behalf of an 
employee; (2) for regulated professions (security guard, private detective, 
armored car driver, and special police officer); (3) for "assumed risk" professions 
(e.g., judge, police officer, public defender, prosecutor, or correctional officer); 
and (4) for personal protection.106 
 
Although the first three categories are self-evident, the Handgun Permit Unit considers more than 
a general concern for personal protection or a “vague threat” when addressing the fourth 
category.107  Even if there is a specific threat listed, the Unit then reviews the threat against the 
following four factors:  
“(1) the "nearness" or likelihood of a threat or presumed threat; (2) whether the 
threat can be verified; (3) whether the threat is particular to the applicant, as 
opposed to the average citizen; (4) if the threat can be presumed to exist, what is 
the basis for the presumption; and (5) the length of time since the initial threat 
occurred.”108 
 
These factors are “nonexhaustive” and therefore the Permit Unit “takes the applicant's entire 
situation into account when considering whether a 'good and substantial reason' exists.”109  The 
permit expires two years after it is issued and can be renewed for successive three year periods 
                                                 
103 Woollard, 712 F.3d  at 869; see also, MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY §5-303(2014). 
104 Id. at 869. 
105 Id.  
106 Id. at 869-870. 
107 Id. at 870.  
108 Id. at  870. 
109 Id. at  870. 
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but each time all the requirements must be met including the “good and substantial cause” 
requirement.110  If a permit is denied, applicants may appeal through  administrative channels 
and if they are denied further they can seek judicial review.111 
 This case was brought by Raymond Woollard who was denied a renewal of his permit to 
carry which was first issued in 2003 and subsequently renewed in 2006 but was denied in 2009 
for a lack of “good and substantial cause.”112  The initial permit was issued after Mr. Woollard’s 
son-in-law, who was high on drugs, broke into his rural Baltimore County home on Christmas 
Eve 2002.113   Mr. Woollard and his son were able to subdue the son-in-law by use of guns they 
had on the premises but it took the police two-and-a-half hours to arrive once called.114  The son-
in-law “received a sentence of probation for the . . . incident but was subsequently incarcerated 
for probation violations.”115 He was released in 2006 and Woollard was able to renew his permit 
to carry shortly thereafter.116  However, in 2009 the permit was denied for failure to show good-
and-substantial reason.117   In their decision, the Handgun Permit Review Board reasoned that the 
only evidence Mr. Woollard gave as a showing of a specific threat was the 2002 incident with his 
son-in-law even though he had not had contact with him since the incident.118  Because he had 
not provided any evidence of a current threat, the Permit Review Board denied his appeal.119 
The district court awarded summary judgement to Mr. Woollard and the Second Amendment 
Foundation finding that “the individual right to possess and carry weapons for self-defense is not 
                                                 
110 Woollard, 712 F.3d at  870. 
111 Id. at  870. 
112 Id. at  871.  
113 Id. at  871. 
114 Id. at  871. 
115 Id. at  871. 
116 Id. at  871. 
117 Id. at  871. 
118 Id. at  871. 
119 Id. at  871. 
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limited to the home.”120   The district court held that the “good and substantial reason” 
requirement “is insufficiently tailored to the State's interest in public safety and crime 
prevention, and impermissibly infringes the right to keep and bear arms" and enjoined 
enforcement of the requirement.121  The Fourth Circuit entered a stay pending appeal and 
accelerated the appellate process to resolve the issue.122   
The court noted that under Heller, the right to bear arms is an individual right for the purpose 
of self-defense but stated that the “core” of that right lies within the home.123  The court found 
the following test used by other circuits as being applicable:  
“[T]he first question is whether the challenged law imposes a burden on conduct 
falling within the scope of the Second Amendment's guarantee. This historical 
inquiry seeks to determine whether the conduct at issue was understood to be 
within the scope of the right at the time of ratification. If it was not, then the 
challenged law is valid. If the challenged regulation burdens conduct that was 
within the scope of the Second Amendment as historically understood, then we 
move to the second step of applying an appropriate form of means-end 
scrutiny.”124 
 
However, the court determined that both steps are not required in order to answer the issue and 
followed the Second Circuit’s lead by simply stating that “we merely assume that the Heller right 
exists outside the home and that such right . . . has been infringed.”125   The court applied an 
intermediate scrutiny standard ultimately finding that the “good and substantial reason 
requirement . . . is reasonably adapted to a substantial governmental interest.”126 
The court began its analysis of the standard of review by determining that the government’s 
interest in reducing the crime rate in Maryland, which at the time was very high when compared 
                                                 
120 Woollard, 712 F.3d at  873. 
121 Id. at  873 (internal quotations omitted). 
122 Id. at  873. 
123 Id. at  873. 
124 Id. at  875. 
125 Id. at  876. 
126 Id. at  876. 
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to other states, was a substantial governmental interest.127    Based on past precedent recognizing 
a distinction between the right to keep arms in the home versus rights outside the home, the court 
also rejected the Appellees argument that the right to carry a firearm for self-defense is a 
fundamental right.128  Because it found that the government had a substantial interest, the court 
moved on to analyze whether the “good and substantial reason” requirement was a reasonable fit 
to that interest.129 
In determining whether Maryland’s requirement was a reasonable fit to the government’s 
substantial interest, the court first looked at Mr. Woollard’s situation and determined that he had 
options for transporting and carrying his handguns under the exception to Maryland’s statute.130   
However, he is barred from carrying his handgun in places were a permit is required unless he 
can meet all of Maryland’s requirements including the “good and substantial reason” 
requirement which he could do by showing an “apprehended danger.”131  The court found that 
the government’s interests overrides Mr. Woollard’s because the State showed that the 
“requirement advances the objectives of protecting public safety and preventing crime because it 
reduces the number of handguns carried in public.”132  The State set forth the following ways in 
which reducing the number of handguns being carried reduces crime:  
Decreasing the availability of handguns to criminals via theft . . .Lessening “the 
likelihood that basic confrontations between individuals would turn deadly . . . 
Averting the confusion, along with the potentially tragic consequences thereof 
that can result from the presence of a third person with a handgun during a 
confrontation between a police officer and a criminal suspect . . .Curtailing the 
                                                 
127 Woollard, 712 F.3d at 876-77 (In 2009 Maryland has the “eighth highest violent crime rate, third highest 
homicide rate and the second highest robbery rate of any state”). 
128 Id. at  877-78. 
129 Id. at  878-79. 
130 Id. at  879 (“For example, Woollard may move handguns to and from bona fide repair shops and places of legal 
purchase and sale. Id. § 4-203(b)(3). Woollard may also wear, carry, and transport handguns if he engages in target 
shoots and practices, sport shooting events, hunting and trapping, specified firearms and hunter safety classes, and 
gun exhibitions. Id. § 4-203(b)(4)-(5).”). 
131 Id. at  879.  
132 Id. at 879. 
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presence of handguns during routine police-citizen encounters. . .Reducing the 
number of handgun sightings that must be investigated . . .Facilitating the 
identification of those persons carrying handguns who pose a menace . . .133 
 
The court also stated that the “good and substantial reason” requirement does not prevent 
someone who does have a specific need for self-defense from protecting themselves within the 
law.134  In discounting the Appellees arguments as to the flaws in the State’s reasoning the court 
showed deference to the legislature’s findings.135  The court therefore upheld Maryland’s “good 
and substantial reason” requirement as constitutional.136 
C. Third Circuit - Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426 (3rd Cir. 2013). 
The Third Circuit reviewed New Jersey’s “justifiable need” requirement in Drake v. Filko 
and found it to be a constitutional burden on the Second Amendment right to bear arms.137  
Under New Jersey’s Handgun Permit Law, anyone seeking to carry a handgun in public for self-
defense must obtain a license by applying to either the chief of police in their town or the 
superintendent of the state police.138   The law provides that: “[n]o application shall be approved 
by the chief police officer or the superintendent unless the applicant demonstrates that he is not 
subject to any of the disabilities set forth in 2C:58–3c. [which includes numerous criminal 
history, age and mental health requirements], that he is thoroughly familiar with the safe 
handling and use of handguns, and that he has a justifiable need to carry a handgun.”139   In New 
Jersey “justifiable need” is defined as: “[T]he urgent necessity for self-protection, as evidenced 
by specific threats or previous attacks which demonstrate a special danger to the applicant’s life 
                                                 
133 Woollard, 712 F.3d at 879-80. 
134 Id. at 880. 
135 Id. at 881. 
136 Id. at 882. 
137 Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 429 (3rd Cir. 2013), cert. denied  sub nom. Drake v. Jerejian, 134 S. Ct. 2134  
(2014). 
138 Id. at 428. 
139 Id. at 428. 
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that cannot be avoided by means other than by issuance of a permit to carry a handgun.”140   This 
standard was further defined by the New Jersey Supreme Court: “Generalized fears for personal 
safety are inadequate, and a need to protect property alone does not suffice.”141 
Four applicants, “a group which included a reserve sheriff’s deputy, a civilian FBI employee, 
an owner of a business that restocks ATM machines and carries large amounts of cash, and a 
victim of an interstate kidnapping,”142 were denied permits on the basis of a lack of justifiable 
need.  They appealed the district court’s ruling that New Jersey’s law was constitutional; arguing 
that “(1) the Second Amendment secures a right to carry arms in public for self-defense; (2) the 
“justifiable need” standard of the Handgun Permit Law is an unconstitutional prior restraint; and 
(3) the standard fails any level of means-end scrutiny a court may apply.”143 
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the decision under a two-part test under which 
the court first determines “whether the challenged law imposes a burden on conduct falling 
within the scope of the Second Amendment’s guarantee.”144 If the conduct is found not to fall 
within the scope further review is unnecessary.145  However, if the conduct is protected by the 
Second Amendment then “means-end scrutiny” is applied.146  The court concluded that the 
conduct did not fall within the scope of the Second Amendment because the New Jersey 
requirement that applicants show a “justifiable need” qualified as a “presumptively lawful” and 
“longstanding” regulation and therefore was excluded from the Heller ruling.147   In Heller, the 
Supreme Court specifically listed certain “long-standing prohibitions”, such as restricting felons’ 
                                                 
140 Drake, 724 F.3d at 428.  
141 Id. at 443 (Hardiman, J. dissenting) (citing In re Preis, 118 N.J. 564, 571 (1990)). 
142 Id. at 443 (Hardiman, J. dissenting). 
143 Id. at 428. 
144 Id. at 429 (citing United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3rd Cir.2010)). 
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146 Id. 
147 Id. at 430. 
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rights to possess a firearm, as “presumptively lawful.”148 The Supreme Court noted that the 
exceptions they listed were simply examples and not the only possibilities149 but “did not provide 
guidance on how to identify other regulations that may qualify.”150   The Third Circuit concluded 
that because New Jersey has included “justifiable need” in its laws in some form since 1924 this 
provision counted as a long-standing prohibition falling under Heller and did not require Second 
Amendment protection.151  Judge Hardiman disagreed with this finding but, as the court also 
reviewed the law under the second prong, this Comment will not detail the argument on that 
issue.152 
Despite finding that the Second Amendment did not apply to New Jersey’s law, the court 
proceeded to analyze the law under the second prong of the test, applying a means end test and 
finding that “it withstands the appropriate, intermediate level of scrutiny.”153   The State provided 
no evidence showing that there was a “reasonable fit” between the “justifiable need” standard 
and their goal of assuring public safety.154  The court found that because the standard was 
implemented before the Second Amendment was incorporated against the states, legislators 
“could not have known that they were potentially burdening protected Second Amendment 
conduct” and therefore the fit is not unreasonable just because evidence was not available.155  
With regard to the burden the requirement places on the individual, the court found that because 
“New Jersey engages in an individualized consideration of each person's circumstances and his 
or her objective, rather than subjective, need to carry  a handgun in public” it meets this 
                                                 
148Drake, 724 F.3d  at 432 (citing District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 – 627, n. 26 (U.S. 2008)   
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152 Id. at 447 (Hardiman, J. dissenting). 
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154 Id. at 438.  
155 Id. 
23 
 
requirement as intermediate scrutiny doesn’t require narrow tailoring.156  Based on this and the 
fact that other courts have found a reasonable fit for the same type of requirement, the court 
found that even under intermediate scrutiny the law would be considered constitutional.157  
D. Ninth Circuit - Peruta v County of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2014). 
Coming to a conflicting conclusion, in Peruta v County of San Diego, the Ninth Circuit 
found San Diego County’s application of California’s good cause requirement to be 
unconstitutional.158  As discussed previously, the Ninth Circuit has since vacated this decision 
and will be rehearing the matter en banc.159  A summary of the court’s original opinion is 
nevertheless included as it is instructive as to how the court may analyze the matter upon further 
review and provides an alternate view of the constitutionality of the justifiable need standard. 
California’s statute regulating licenses to carry a concealed weapon requires that “good cause 
exists for issuance of the license” but does not define “good cause.”160 California gives authority 
to grant licenses for concealed carry to cities and counties with the requirement that they create 
and post a written policy containing a summary of the statutes.161  Under San Diego County’s 
application of the statute, applicants must “show a sufficiently pressing need for self-protection” 
and “demonstrate circumstances that distinguish [him] from the mainstream.”162 Five applicants 
challenged this interpretation as an impermissible burden on their Second Amendment right to 
bear arms.163 
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The court reviewed the matter under the two-step test provided by Heller for reviewing rights 
under the Second Amendment: 1) Is the right the applicants are seeking to enforce one that is 
within the scope of the Second Amendment protections? and 2) Does the challenged 
interpretation infringe upon the right?164    In order to determine whether the right to carry a 
concealed weapon outside the home is a right protected by the Second Amendment, the court 
addressed both the textual meaning and “public understanding” of the phrase to “keep and bear 
arms” and the historical treatment of the scope.165   The court then analyzed the degree to which 
the right was burdened by first determining what, or if any, form of scrutiny should be applied.166 
The court began its examination of the textual and historical background of the scope by 
focusing on the meaning of the term to “bear arms”.167  It found that to “bear” in the context of 
the Second Amendment meant not simply to carry, but to carry for the purpose of “being armed 
and ready for offensive or defensive action in a case of conflict with another person.”168  Based 
upon this view, the court found it nonsensical that the right would be restricted to one’s home 
since you would not carry a loaded firearm throughout your daily routine within the home for 
purposes of defending oneself from a confrontation.169  In determining that the right extended 
beyond the home, the court also found certain nuances in the Heller and McDonald opinions 
strongly suggestive.170  Heller “secures the right to protect[] [oneself] against both public and 
private violence, thus extending the right in some form to wherever a person could become 
exposed to public or private violence.”171  Both Heller and McDonald refer to the need for 
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protection being most critical within the home which implies that there is also a need for 
protection outside the home.172  By including “laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in 
sensitive places such as school and government buildings” in the list of “presumptively lawful” 
restrictions, the court viewed Heller as acknowledging there is a right to carry a firearm outside 
the home otherwise it would not have singled them out.173  Most importantly, the court noted that 
“both Heller and McDonald identify the core component of the right as self-defense, which 
necessarily take[s] place wherever [a] person happens to be.”174   
The court delved into a detailed historical analysis of previous treatment of the right to bear 
arms, reviewing precedent from the time of ratification to post-civil war time.175 The court first 
established that there should be a ranking to how precedent is reviewed, given that Heller 
determined that the right to keep and bear arms “is, and has always been, an individual right . . . 
oriented to the end of self-defense.”176  Therefore, it grouped historical precedent into three 
categories in order of significance:  
(1) authorities that understands bearing arms for self-defense to be an 
individual right, (2) authorities that understand bearing arms for a purpose other 
than self-defense to be an individual right, and (3) authorities that understand 
bearing arms not to be an individual right at all.177  
 
 The court reviewed case law from early nineteenth-century courts, finding that courts in 
the first category, which viewed the right to bear arms as individual right with the purpose of 
self-defense, found a ban on both open and concealed carry to be a “destruction of the right” 
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173 Id. (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570,  626 (2008)).  
174 Id. (citing Eugene Volokh, Symposium: The Second Amendment and the Right to Bear Arms After D.C. v. Heller: 
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granted by the Second Amendment.178  Therefore, the court concluded that “carrying a gun 
outside the home for self-defense comes within the meaning of “bear[ing] Arms.”179 
 The court then addressed the extent to which San Diego County’s application of the 
“good cause” requirement burdened the right to bear arms for self-defense in public.180  In order 
to determine which level of scrutiny to apply to the issue the court first answered the question of 
whether the licensing scheme burdened the right or destroyed it.181   In California there is not a 
permitting scheme for open carry of a firearm and therefore “it is illegal in virtually all 
circumstances” to carry a firearm openly regardless of whether it is loaded or not.182  Under 
California law, certain classes of people are able to carry a concealed firearm without a permit: 
active and retired police officers, military personnel, and retired federal officers.183  Additionally, 
a firearm may be carried on private property, places of business or “where hunting is 
allowed.”184  California also makes an exception for situations of “immediate, grave danger in 
the brief interval before and after the local law enforcement agency, when reasonably possible, 
has been notified of the danger and before the arrival of its assistance.”185  Yet, without a permit, 
the “typical responsible, law-abiding citizen [of San Diego County is not able] to bear arms in 
public for the lawful purpose of self-defense”.186  The only citizens of San Diego County that are 
able to carry are those who are included in the exceptions above or those who can show that they 
face a “unique risk of harm” under circumstances which differentiate them from the rest of the  
                                                 
178 Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1160. 
179 Id. at 1167. 
180 Id. 
181 Id. at 1168. 
182 Id. 
183 Id. 
184 Id. at 1169. 
185 Id.;  see also,CAL PEN CODE § 26045. 
186 Id. at1169. 
27 
 
society.187   The court found that the right has been “destroyed when exercise of the right is 
limited to a few people, in a few places, at a few times.”188 Because the court determined that 
San Diego County’s application of “good cause” destroyed the Second Amendment rights of the 
parties, as in Heller, it found the policy per se invalid.189  “A law effecting a “destruction of the 
right” rather than merely burdening it is, after all, an infringement under any light.”190  
E. Analysis of the courts’ findings 
The courts that find the ‘justifiable need” requirement constitutional have a few similarities in 
their analysis: none attempt to determine the scope of the Second Amendment and they employ 
intermediate scrutiny in a loose manner granting significant deference to the findings of 
legislature.191  There are courts that have “applied the [heightened scrutiny] standard so loosely 
to firearm cases that it takes on the attributes of rational basis review” because these courts have 
“presume[ed] constitutionality with almost unlimited deference to the legislative process, and 
accept[ed] justifications based upon speculation rather than evidence.”192 If the purpose of 
heightened scrutiny is truly as “Justice O'Connor noted [to] help[] to ensure that . . . the State's 
asserted interests are not merely a pretext for exclusionary or anti-competitive restrictions" then 
the courts must require more evidence from the legislature.193  With regard to the deference 
required to show the legislature, deference is only to be given to the determination of whether a 
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substantial interest has been affected and whether the statute will positively address the issue.194  
However, “when assessing the fit between the asserted interests and the means chosen to 
advance them" no such deference is required.195  Unlike the Second, Third and Fourth Circuits, 
the Ninth Circuit conducted a full historical review and scope analysis but did not truly apply a 
form of scrutiny because it found the right to carry arms in public for self-defense to be a core 
right covered by the Second Amendment and therefore, followed Heller’s lead in approaching 
the right as having been destroyed thereby finding the application of the “good cause” 
requirement per se impermissible.196  While the Ninth Circuit made mention of intermediate 
scrutiny, it criticized the applications made by the other courts but did not truly apply the 
scrutiny itself.197  The courts should apply intermediate scrutiny as it was intended, conducting a 
full review of the government’s findings to ensure that the “justifiable need” requirement is a 
reasonable fit and reduces crime more than background checks, mental health reports, 
fingerprinting and other measures alone do.  
IV. Standards of Review as Applied to Second Amendment 
As shown in the previous Part, the standard of review a court chooses and how they apply 
it is crucial to the determination of our rights as citizens. Those courts that granted great 
deference to the government without requiring more evidence as to the reasonable fit between 
the requirement of “justifiable need” and State’s substantial interest have allowed the rights 
granted by the Second Amendment to the citizens of those states to be diminished.  This Part will 
begin with a description of the different standards that are applied in the Second Amendment 
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context and a recap of how they have been applied to the “justifiable need” issue so far and will 
conclude by recommending a heightened form of intermediate scrutiny be used in the future.  
A. Description of Applicable Standard of Review Options    
Under strict scrutiny the burden on the affected right must be “genuinely necessary to 
serve a compelling government interest.”198  The statute must be “narrowly tailored” to address 
that interest.199  The burden is unconstitutional if the concerns raised by the government can be 
resolved through the use of alternative solutions which are less restrictive and burdensome on the 
right then what has already been proposed.200 Justice Scalia argued against strict scrutiny in 
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 
(1990), suggesting it “was not appropriate in most free exercise cases because many burdensome 
laws were nevertheless necessary for the public welfare” and that many laws would not be able 
to meet the “compelling interest” standard and the result would be “courting anarchy.”201    
“[U]nder intermediate scrutiny the government must assert a significant, substantial, or 
important interest; there must also be a reasonable fit between that asserted interest and the 
challenged law, such that the law does not burden more conduct than is reasonably necessary.”202 
Intermediate scrutiny balances the safety of the public against the rights of the individual.203  
Some courts apply a degree of intermediate scrutiny known as exacting scrutiny which “requires 
the challenged law to have a substantial relation to a sufficiently important governmental 
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interest, which must reflect the seriousness of the . . . burden on the exercise of a constitutional 
right.”204 
Another possible standard of review which has been used at the state level is reasonable 
regulation which is very similar to intermediate scrutiny.  The focus of this standard is on 
“whether a restriction is a “reasonable regulation” or a prohibition.”205 While the states find most 
regulations constitutional there are some cases where they do strike down those laws that 
“substantially burden people’s ability to defend themselves.”206 
In contrast to the reasonable regulation and intermediate scrutiny tests, rational basis 
review focuses on the rationality of the government’s stated goal.207  The focus of the rational 
basis test is that the regulation is rationally related to the goal thus “a rational legislator could 
conclude that banning all firearms furthers public safety.”208  According to one scholar, 
“[o]rdinary forms of gun control such as licensing laws, bans on concealed carry, and 
prohibitions on particular types of weapons are, . . . attempts to regulate the right rather than 
eliminate it and are routinely upheld. So long as a gun control measure is not a total ban on the 
right to bear arms, the courts will consider it a mere regulation of the right.”209 
B. Intermediate Scrutiny is the Appropriate Standard for Right to Carry Analysis 
Although many gun rights activists argue that strict scrutiny is required to protect their 
gun ownership, critics reply that by applying strict scrutiny “the legislative duty to protect the 
public safety will be profoundly frustrated.”210    However, others contend that the distinction 
between intermediate and strict scrutiny is irrelevant because the main interests that gun control 
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laws serve, prevention of “violent crime, injury and death” are compelling interests that would 
overcome the strict scrutiny standard.211  “Under this general approach, severe restrictions on the 
"core" right have been thought to trigger a kind of strict scrutiny, while less severe burdens have 
been reviewed under some lesser form of heightened scrutiny.”212 
Despite this, applying strict scrutiny to gun control regulations could result in presumably 
reasonable regulations being struck down due to the requirement that the law be narrowly 
tailored.213  In Tyler v. Hillsdale Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t,214 the Sixth Circuit determined that strict 
scrutiny is the proper analysis to apply to gun control legislation because: 
“[First] [t]he Supreme Court has by now been clear and emphatic that the 
right to keep and bear arms is a fundamental right necessary to our system of 
ordered liberty . . . Although it is true that strict scrutiny is not always implicated 
when a fundamental right is at stake, the Supreme Court has suggested that there 
is a presumption in favor of strict scrutiny when a fundamental right is involved. . 
. [Second] the courts of appeals originally adapted the levels of scrutiny of Second 
Amendment jurisprudence by looking to the First Amendment doctrine but that 
First Amendment doctrine reflects a preference for strict scrutiny more often than 
for intermediate scrutiny. . . [Third] strict scrutiny is preferable because this is a 
doctrinal area in which the Court has not simply refrained from suggesting that 
lesser review is called for but one in which it has strongly indicated that 
intermediate scrutiny should not be employed. . . Fourth . . . because it has no 
basis in the Constitution. Both the Court and the academy have said as much. 
The Heller Court's reasons for explicitly rejecting rational-basis scrutiny apply 
equally to intermediate scrutiny. The Court rejected rational-basis scrutiny 
for Second Amendment challenges because it "is a mode of analysis we have used 
when evaluating laws under constitutional commands that 
are themselves prohibitions on irrational laws ”215 
 
Intermediate scrutiny appears to make sense if the right to protect oneself in public is 
seen as an important, but not fundamental, right that requires there to be more than a simple 
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relation between the law and its purpose.  Requiring a level of scrutiny higher than rational basis 
but lower than strict scrutiny will guard against arbitrary laws that are not supported by evidence 
only if the courts apply the deference properly.216   However, the courts, when reviewing whether 
the need is important, accord substantial deference to the [legislature’s] predictive judgments.”217 
Conversely if intermediate scrutiny is applied regulations that are too burdensome may be found 
to still be a “reasonable fit” when there are less restrictive ways for the government to meet their 
goal.218   
As discussed previously, the Second, Third and Fourth Circuits applied intermediate 
scrutiny loosely, choosing not to insist upon specific evidence that showed the regulations in 
place will actually have a positive effect upon the substantial interest.219 “In applying a strict 
version of intermediate review, courts should demand that empirical data be presented that 
supports a gun restriction.”220 The Ninth Circuit on the other hand applied Heller almost directly 
finding that the application of “good cause” as San Diego County interprets it is per se 
impermissible.221  
While the Heller Court did not specifically set a standard of review for the Second 
Amendment, by addressing both the burden of and the necessity for regulation and weighing the 
interests, it at least appeared to lean towards intermediate scrutiny.222   
“Earlier in the opinion, the [Heller] Court similarly justified striking down 
the handgun ban on the grounds that the ban is a “severe restriction.” In the 
process, the Court favorably quoted an old case distinguishing permissible 
“regulati[on]” from impermissible destruction of the right and from impermissible 
laws that make guns wholly useless for the purpose of defence.  The Court did not 
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discuss what analysis would be proper for less “severe” restrictions, likely 
because the facts did not require such a discussion. But its analysis suggested that 
the severity of the burden was important.”223 
 Both the history and text of the Second Amendment show that the right to carry a 
firearm for self-defense is an individual right protected by the Second Amendment.  
While it is a fundamental right, the government has an undeniably strong interest to 
regulate that right to protect the public.  However, this interest does not entitle them to 
run roughshod over the rights of the individual.  While it is tempting to apply strict 
scrutiny to the right to carry a firearm for protection in public, courts should be cautious 
to ensure that a reasonable law that actually would  protect the public is not struck down 
because it is not “narrowly tailored.”  . Applying a heightened form of intermediate 
scrutiny that requires courts to seriously consider all the evidence of the effect of the 
legislation, rather than grant substantial deference, will ensure that the protections needs 
of both the individual and the government will be given correct consideration. 
V. The Justifiable Need Requirement is Unconstitutional  
Whether the requirement to show a “justifiable need” is reviewed under strict scrutiny or 
intermediate scrutiny, the result is that the requirement burdens the right more than is reasonably 
necessary to meet the government’s goal, especially when applied to both open and concealed 
carry permits.   “Only by engaging in a true fit analysis are we faithful both to the Supreme 
Court’s rejection of naked interest balancing and to its reminder that the Second Amendment is 
“not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for 
whatever purpose.”224 
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In the New Jersey case, the appellants included “reserve sheriff’s deputy who wishes to 
carry a gun for self-defense while off duty, . . . a civilian FBI employee who received specific 
information that a terrorist organization might target him or his family, . . . [and] an owner of an 
ATM restocking company who routinely carries large amounts of cash”225  If people with 
circumstances and credentials such as this cannot obtain a permit to carry a concealed gun who 
would be eligible?  This demonstrates, at least in New Jersey, how high the bar really is under 
the justifiable need requirement and calls into question whether there truly is a right to carry 
concealed, or open, at all in New Jersey. “Even assuming that New Jersey is correct to conclude 
that fewer guns means less crime, a rationing system that burdens the exercise of a fundamental 
constitutional right by simply making that right more difficult to exercise cannot be considered 
reasonably adapted to a governmental interest because it burdens the right too broadly. The 
regulation must be more targeted than that to meet intermediate scrutiny.”226 
According to the Crime Prevention Research Center’s July 14th report, the states with may- 
issue permitting schemes have significantly low numbers of the adult population with permits to 
carry.227 In New Jersey, for example, only .02% of the state’s population has a permit to carry.228  
Although this could be because few people in those states wish to carry, looking at this statistic 
in conjunction with the facts of Drake v Filko it seems more likely that the process was too 
burdensome or there were many denials.  “One study undertook to determine the relationships 
between firearm homicide, firearm suicide, total homicide, and total suicide, and age 
requirements for handgun purchase and possession, "one-gun-a[-]month" laws, "shall issue" 
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carry permits, and bans on cheap handguns.  No relationships could be found between these laws 
and homicide or suicide, except that "shall issue" permits were associated with higher firearm 
homicide and homicide rates, but not at a statistically significant level.”229  Additionally, “no 
relationship could be found between imposition of the waiting period, or of the background 
check, and firearms homicide and suicide, with one exception--that of suicide victims aged fifty-
five or older. That finding was somewhat offset by a rise in nonfirearm suicides, leaving a 
modest (though not statistically significant) reduction."230  
If measures such as background checks and waiting periods, which are much more related to 
the security of the person handling the gun than the requirement that they be able to show that 
they are facing a specific threat, do not show a statistically significant change in rates of violence 
then it is hard to find a reasonable fit for the “justifiable need” requirement to the substantial 
interest of the government in protecting the public from those carrying firearms lawfully.  
VI. Conclusion 
The Second Amendment allows individuals the right to carry a concealed firearm for the 
purpose of self-defense.  Although some form of gun control is necessary and reasonable, the 
requirement of justifiable need, good cause or proper cause creates an unreasonable burden on 
the right and therefore is unconstitutional under any measure of scrutiny. 
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